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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/03/2004

Accident number: 341

Accident time: 08:30

Accident Date: 29/08/2000

Where it occurred: Jahorina, Palosevina

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 01/09/2000

ID original source: AS/AA/BK

Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
metal fragments
pylons and surrounds
rocks/stones

Date record created: 21/02/2004

Date last modified: 17/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: y= 44785 x=42473

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: JNA 526-3-1

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name: 1.25.000

Accident Notes
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
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Accident report
The following is the MAC’s Accident report, edited for anonymity.

INTRODUCTION
Due to demining accident that occurred on August 29th 2000 on Jahorina mountain (location
Palosevina), one of the [Demining group] deminers, [the Victim]. Due to this accident, BH
MAC Director convened a Board of Inquiry in order to conduct an investigation and stating the
circumstances of how the accident occurred.
The Board consisted of:
Chairman – Coordination Department, BH MAC
Member -RO Sarajevo F MAC
Member -RO Pale RS MAC
The [Demining group] organisation provided BH MAC the information on the accident August
29th 2000 by phone, while the Initial report was submitted the same day at 09.00 hrs.
In compliance with the BH Standard, Board of Inquiry gathered at the place of the accident at
11.30 hrs. Upon arrival on the site, the BoI had a short briefing with the director of the
organisation, as well as with the team leader, group leader, monitor and deminer No 2. BoI as
well gathered all the written statements of the personnel involved.

SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND THE PROCEDURES OF TASKING
Pale municipality and the Jahorina Olympic centre requested the demining at the mentioned
location, in order to conduct the reconstruction of the power lines that are set from the
direction of Dvoriste location.
After general survey was conducted by the Entity MAC of RS, it was assigned its ID No
Jahorina –Paloševina 1000277. The map where the site is marked is JNA 1:25.000, sheet
526-3-1, grid references of the datum point x=42525 and y=44805. The task was financed
through the International Trust Fund. The [Demining group] organisation that was assigned
with this task started work on July 18th 2000. Integral demining was used during the conduct
of clearance (mechanical preparation of the ground, manual operations and the use of EDDs.)
Mechanical preparation of the ground has been conducted at a larger part of mined area,
which was marked as mined, and of high risk. Mechanical preparation did reduce the mine
threat and enabled the use of EDDs on the area. Since there are steep rocky slopes on the
site as well as areas covered with rocks due to NATO bombing of the former radar objects of
VRS (former JNA facility), these parts could not have been mechanically prepared. Three
demining teams were included in demining within this task.
There is a sketch of the minefield in the Red Folder as well as the interview with the
participant of war, [name excised] who was a member of the engineering unit of the VRS. She
participated in mining a part of Jahorina Mountain. Relying to her memory, she showed a part
of the mined area.
Minefield was laid by the VRS in 1992 in order to protect the radar facility that was treated it
JNA documentation as ‘facility No 5’ (0-5).
General Survey report is given as annex D to this report. [Not made available.]
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[The accident area is shown above.]

GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
The area where the task is (the peaks of Jahorina mountain), the area is mild slopes without
too much high vegetation. The ground is covered with dense and harsh mountain grass,
which is not too high, so the use of the vegetation cutting tools was of a minimum. There are
not many trees and the existing ones are rather low, due to heavy winds and sharp winters.
Stones are protruding the surface of the task area at certain parts, so it was hard to use the
prodder at all places. There is a part of the task area (especially the steep part to the West),
which is not shown as mined at the sketch and which is full of rocks fallen over from the
bombing. This can be easily seen on the photographs provided in Annex E. [The Annex was
not made available but some of the pictures were.]
This area is not inhabited, but is has abundance of healthy herbs during the summer period. It
is as well very suitable for the stock due to quality grass during spring, summer and autumn.
One of the accidents that happened a year ago on Jahorina was due to bringing the stock to
be fed.
To the East of these peaks, the most distant poles for the power lines and Jahorina Olympics
ski-climbing facilities are located. There is not much possibility of activating a mine in this area
during winter and early spring due to great quantities of snow that practically covers the whole
mountain.
Since the task site is located very high (1900 m), it is very suitable for demining during
summer period.
The safe area for this task was supposed to be the part that fenced around the military facility,
being a part of the facility. This is the place where the teams established their Control Points
and other designated areas. A part of this fence was broken during the bombing, but the parts
of poles and the barbed wire can still be seen. According to the incomplete sketch, the
suspect and mined area is the one leading toward the fence, from all the sides expect from
the East, which leads the access road from Pale. There is a damaged water tower in the very
vicinity of the task site where team S-1 worked, which is within the safe area of the 0-5
facilities. At the same location there are two craters as a result of NATO bombing. One is just
above the left box marked for the use of EDDs. There is a line of fence leading just above that
crater (the part of the fence that is damaged – shown on photographs at Annex E).

THE PRIORITY OF THE TASK
The priority to this task was issued because of the needed reconstruction of the power lines,
on order to re-settle the winter sports facilities on Jahorina, that would then enable the need
electricity for both the tourism and the refugees from Sarajevo that are located on Jahorina
mountain.
The RS MAC upon the request provided by the Pale municipality set the priority to this task
and Jahorina Olympics centre. As stated above, it is for the reconstruction of the part of the
power lines leading from the direction of Dvoriste, which were damaged during last winter. It
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supplies the electricity for the power stations for Jahorina facilities and further on over
Jahorina Mountain.
The reality of the priority for the task is the safe power supply for both winter tourism, facilities
in which the Serb refugees from Sarajevo are settled (hotels '?ator' and 'Jahorina' and the
surrounding weekend houses). It is also for the knowledge of the real mine threat and the
surrounding military facilities, since there were two civilian and two mine accidents at this site
already.

TASKSITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
The task site layout is done in accordance to BH Standard and the SOP of [the Demining
group] organisation. The administrative area is shared for all the three teams. It is within the
natural shelter (the peak of a slope with a small valley inside). The administrative area is
accessible from the S/E side, leading into the ring of the safe and fenced area of the 0-5
military facilities. (Sketch provided in Annex E).
Control point of every team is located within the administrative area. There are also parking
lots, medical areas, areas for equipment, rest areas as well as the area for daily EDD check
(10x10 box). Explosives storage is located in a bunker 50 m away from the other areas, while
the latrines are located to the East, in the part of the facility that was bombed. Access areas
are over 50 metres long, which is very satisfactory for the natural shelter of the administrative
area. The testing of detectors is conducted prior to commencement of works and after the
team leader replaces the batteries. This is documented in the form attached as annex F.
While-on-working-check is conducted by the deminer, using the test piece in which the fuse of
UPMAH-3 is placed. Every two-men team is placing it for the check in the safe part of their
working lane.
Marking of the task site area is conducted correctly. Access lanes are 2 metres wide and
marked with 1.2 or 1.5 m high, of a maximum distance of 6 metres, from administrative area
to the safe area and area cleared so far. There are clear borders between the safe (cleared)
and unsafe areas. Working lane between two boxes where the accident occurred is marked
with pickets and attached with the tape at the ground level. Locations of mines found so far at
this site are properly marked with yellow tipped pickets, so it is easy to follow the area of the
ring that was mined outside of the military radar facility (O-5).
The task site layout is in absolute compliance with the requests set in BH Standard and the
[Demining group] SOP.

SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON THE SITE
The leader of the Sierra team (S-1), was the immediate supervisor to the team, experienced
and able organizer of the tasks, included in demining from 1966.
The Group Leader was performing a higher level supervision. He filled the report on his visit
and quality control to this team on August 22nd 2000.
[Name excised] was the external supervisor for the contractor, from the [name excised]
monitoring organization. He was monitoring the two teams working (team S-1 and C-1).

QUALITY ASSURANCE
Apart from the team leader who is constantly in charge for the QA of the team’s work, the
group leader who is immediate level of supervision to the teams performed the same function
on the site. According to his function, he is conduction the internal QC along with the QC
officer of the organization. According to the requests from the SOP, QA officer has visited the
site once in 7 days (August 18th 2000). This visit is documented on Internal Quality Control
Report, and is it left for the review of RS MAC inspections and to the team leader for
realization.

4

RO Pale inspectors were visiting this site in compliance to BH Standard. The last visit that is
documented was on August 21st 2000.
Since the task is opened on July 18th, total of 10 RO MAC Pale inspections were conducted
over three teams (S-1, C-1 and C-2).
Regarding the internal and external quality control as well as monitoring, there were no
breaching of the procedures on the site.
The approved copy of [the Demining group] SOP was available on the site.

COMMUNICATIONS
Both HF and VHF communications were used during the conduct of this task. Every team
apart from this had a mobile phone. Communication system is in absolute accordance with
the requirements of the SOP. The optical distance between the Operational Centre and the
site is about 10 km, so the hand-held Motorola VHF radio device was sufficient for
maintenance of communications within the team, amongst the team and towards the
Operational Centre.
The communication was maintained by the medic, truck driver for shared equipment of all the
three teams, as well as team leader if on Control Point.
Operational Centre was informed about the accident by the group leader, using the VHF
hand-held GP-300 radio.

MEDICAL COVERAGE
By the very Control Point, within the safe zone, there are three medics with their vehicles and
equipment needed for every team. Such medical coverage complies with BH Standard
requirements entirely and is justified from the mine threat aspect on this task.
S-1 medic and C-1 medic provided the first emergency aid within the safe area which the
injured deminer reached himself. He left the working lane with the help of deminer No 2.
On activating the mine PMA-3 with the prodder, the deminer had no helmet with the visor on
his head. Therefore he suffered injuries to his left eye and scratches from the soil and stones
moved by the explosion blast. Compress pad was put on his left eye and his head was
bandaged too. The injured deminer had no other visible injuries and he was totally aware
while going with the medic to the Kasindol hospital immediately after the accident. He
reached the hospital within 45 minutes. After the medical aid was provided to him from the
specialist doctor, he was forwarded to a higher medical facility in Belgrade (Military Medical
Academy) due to further medical treatment of his eye that was injured by the blast.
When we arrived on site for the investigation (11.30 hrs), we were informed that the injured
had left for Belgrade with medical vehicle from Pale medical facility.
Operational Centre of the organisation had informed the Kasindol hospital about the accident
so that the injured can be treated and further forwarded if needed.

PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND THE TEAM’S IDs
This demining operation at this task consisted of three [Demining group] teams working (S-1,
C-1 and C-2). The team where the accident occurred is Sierra 1 (S-1) consisting of the
following employees:
the team leader,
deminer and the deputy team leader,
6 x deminer
5 x dog-handler
medic.
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As a monitor on behalf of the contractor in order to review the procedures of the contract,
there was [Name excised], who was as well monitoring the C-1 team that worked along the S1 team.
Written statements were taken from all the personnel who were included in this accident.
They are attached as Annex C of the report. [Not made available.]
The Board of Inquiry has not talked either to the injured deminer or any of the medic staff
except for the team medic, so there were no actual information on the situation and the
probable length of medical treatment, since the injured was almost immediately forwarded to
Belgrade MMA.
Copy of deminers’ insurance is given in Annex G. [Not made available.]

[The Victim’s long prodder is shown above - in the blast crater.]

TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT
Tools and equipment used by the team consisted of:
EBEX 420 PB metal detector,
Prodder
Spade.
Shears,
Helmets with visor and protective jackets.
Prior to the commencement of the task, each two men team along with the team leader
conducted the detector check while the results of possibility of locating UPMAH-3 fuse were
imported into file required by their SOP. Detector was found in the lane and was tested by the
Board of Inquiry. It has been proved absolutely operational. While checking the stated
working lane, it has been confirmed that the lane was metal-contaminated (probably the
bombs shrapnel). The detector could have checked only 20% of the ground. Upon arrival of
the Board, the C-2 team was required to once again clear the critical lane with their team
leader in order to investigate the actual place of the accident, check the crater, type and
possible position of the activated mine.
Prodders used by the members of the team are in compliance with the requirements of BH
Standard. On the day of the accident it was possible to prod with this prodder to the depth of
10 cm.

DETAILS ON EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INVOLVED
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Explosive device that caused the accident was a PMA-3 mine. The plastic parts of its bottom
were found in the explosion crater. The ring-shaped rubber that connects the halves as well
as the parts of the plastic ring of the handle with a spring were found to the right side,
backwards for about one metre from the crater with the very edge of the left side of the box,
which is clearly seen on photos No 7 and 8, Annex E.
According to the parts of the mine found, especially the rubber part, it is clear that the branch
of the explosion blast was directed to the face and upper right part of the body towards the
shoulder. This is clearly seen on the protective jacket, which was taken off by the medic
during providing the first emergency aid. Regarding the very location of the crater, where the
soil is in a mild slope, it is possible that the mine in the soil was placed leaned backwards and
slightly to the right. From what is stated above, it is probable that the angle of the prod was
more that 300 related to the position of the mine. Due to relatively hard surface, the prod was
probably harder, with no sense of touching the rubber. That activated the mine. It can be
stated that even less force was needed for the activation of the mine since it was laid in the
ground and remained there from 1992. According to the data provided on this mine (JNA
manuals), it is reliable regarding its primary characteristics for since months if in the ground.
Since the mine’s top part gets older and stains, the mine is loosing its stability. Therefore, less
force is needed for the activation of these mines, which was also proved by the mechanical
preparation of the ground, when almost 90% of those mines were not activated.
According to the data gathered by the Board of Inquiry that lead the investigation, from the
August 23rd to the moment of the investigation (there were no works in this period) i.e. to the
August 29th 2000, there were 219 mines found, the following numbers of items:
PMA-1=43;
PMA–3=171 (two of these activated, one in the previous and one in this accident);
PMR-2A=2;
PMA-2=2;
MRUD=1 and
One piece of UXO

EVIDENCE ON REMINING
There is no evidence of remining at the stated location regarding the fact that there were 5
days off, given to the teams because of the accident that happened on the same site August
23rd 2000.
CLOTHES AND PERSONNAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
The injured deminer was not wearing the minim set, which is the visor, i.e. the helmet with the
visor, which he had as a part of his equipment.

The photos of the protective jacket with the traces of the explosion blast are given in Annex E.
[The Annex was not made available but some of the pictures were. The Victim’s frag-jacket is
shown above.]

THE USE OF DOGS
There were five EDD teams within the demining team S-1. The EDD teams were used for the
search of the area previously prepared by the machines for mechanical preparation of the
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ground. EDD teams were also used for location the first rows of the mines at the task areas
that were supposed to be technically surveyed, since the slopes or the contamination with
huge rocks prevented the use of the machines for mechanical preparation of the ground. Two
EDD teams were deployed to search boxes, while the third EDD team was used as internal
quality control or as a substitute for one of the two EDD teams, if shown that some of the
EDDs have no sufficient interest for work at a certain day.
On the day of the accident, the EDDs were still not deployed on the task site since the team
leader decided that the area around two rock in the lane between boxes need to be checked.
(EDDs that were searching the box to the right were working with C-1 team right before the
accident that happened on August 23rd – they have been disturbed but haven't located the
mine). According to the dog-handlers' statements, the dogs were disturbed when searched
the right box from the lane cleared. However, they have only indicated one mine that was
later on located in the lower left half of the box.
The place were this mine was found in the box is marked with yellow tipped picket, which is
shown on photograph No 4, Annex E. [Not made available.]

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
Based on the statements taken from the personnel from the team as well as the details from
the team leader's Diary (consisting the activities up to the moment when the accident
occurred), the BoI had reviewed the account of activities that went as follows:
07.00 hrs – the team left their base in Brus where they were accommodated. They arrived at
the Control Point slightly before 08,00 hrs which is 24 km away. Upon arrival on site,
deminers prepared themselves for work as a routine, the team leader is going over the
operational part of the site and controls its status in comparison with the previous five days,
which is how long the works were stopped due to the previous accident.
Around 08.00 hrs the team leader is conducting a briefing having his focus on the missed
mine that caused the previous accident. He briefs about paying lots of attention to the conduct
of proper procedures and safety measures, stating that mines that were not activated can
even be underneath the big rocks that were covering the pieces of the site, all due to NATO
bombing. The team leader was aware all the time about the dogs being disturbed prior to the
first accident in the upper part of the right box. Dog handlers notified him that the EDDs were
leaving the left middle part to the right part of the working lane, where two big rocks have
been located and never moved during this clearance. For this particular reason, a two-men
team was assigned with checking the area around these two suspect rocks.
Around 08.10 hrs the communication with the Operational Centre was checked. After the
detectors' check, the deminers in two-men teams left for their task. [The Victim] was the first
one to work in the critical working lane, while supported by deminer No 2.
At 08.30 explosion was heard and all the works stopped within all the three teams.
Emergency first aid was provided immediately and the injured was transferred to Kasindol
hospital. Operational Centre of the organisation was notified of the accident immediately. The
teams remained on their rest areas near Control Point, waiting for the BoI to appear. The
Board of Inquiry arrived at 11.30 hrs.

SUMMARY
The team where the accident happened (Sierra-1) has been working at this site since August
17th 2000. The place where demining accident occurred is of a hard soil, which diminishes
the possibilities of proper prodding, while the area itself is contaminated with shrapnel that
came as a result of the bombing. It is possible to use detectors on just a few places on the
entire area. Mechanical preparation of the ground was conducted the previous working day,
i.e. the day when the previous accident happened in team C-1 (August 23rd 2000) – shown
on photographs in Annex E, photos 1, 4 and 5. The diminishing of the use of the mechanical
preparation of the ground is the direct result of the rocks scattered around the area since the
bombing. Both the photographs and the survey of the area clearly show that the machine had
partially searched, i.e. cut the right box that has not been treated with EDDs.
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It also cut through the working lane at two places and entered the left box (for about 0.5
metres) at a location underneath the very place of the accident. The left box was checked on
the day of the previous accident. This is clearly shown on photographs where the chains have
touched the rocks and broke some of them into smaller pieces. Machine went as well into the
right box up to half (if looked from W/E direction towards the peak). The entrance and the
work of the machine were partial due to scattered rocks. It has been shown that the machine
did not catch the first mined area that were not even mined, if looked at the sketch. The EDDs
had indicated the first PMA-3 mine in the left box that was not prepared by the machine.
The first rock that was moved by [the Victim]. He conducted this move in order to search the
location underneath the stone. The previous disturbance of EDDs on that area was confirmed
by him activating the mine. The rock that covered the location of the mine involved was
probably thrown at that place due to bombing explosion, but had not activated the mine due to
its big and flat surface. The rock was removed to approximately 1 m under the crater, at the
very edge of the box (photograph 5, Annex E). The traces of its previous position on the
ground above the crater of the activated mine are shown in photographs 6 and 9.
The location of new mines that were not marked in the sketch by the task itself, prove the fact
that the entire ring about the facility was mined totally. Those were the first irregularly laid
mines that actually connect the mined area from the West side leading towards the C-1 team.
Within seven days of the team's work on the site (mostly mechanical preparation of the
ground), its productivity was real[istic] in comparison with the local conditions and the usage
of integral demining methods (5 EDD teams, eight deminers).

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Pale police was notified about the accident and conducted their own investigation the same
day, after the Board of Inquiry had finished theirs. At approximately a kilometre from the
location of the accident the BoI had met the police vehicle heading for their investigation.
Two mine accidents had happened at the wider Jahorina area as documented so far. There
was one [civilian] mine accident and a demining accident in C-1 team on this site that
happened August 23rd 2000. The location of that demining accident is on the west side of the
mined ring, leading towards North, at about 100 distance from the accident this report is
referring to.

CONCLUSIONS
Based on what is stated above, the BoI can make the following conclusions:
The critical mine activated by [the Victim] WAS underneath the big rock thrown on the ground
during the bombing. The rock mentioned did not activate the mine due to its large leaning
surface.
It is possible to activate a PMA-3 in the hard surface since it is hard to make a difference
when touching the rubber part with the prodder. It is what the demining work consists of. In
this particular case, it was easier to activate the mine due to the slope of the ground, the
position of the mine as well as the length of time it actually was in the ground. This means
that it did not require the same force of prodding in comparison to the period of 6 months
when it is laid and reliable regarding its activation characteristics.
If the deminer had used entire set of equipment he was issued (the minimum) containing the
visor, i.e. helmet with the visor, which is more than the minimum prescribed by BH MAC, his
eye and face probably would have not been hurt. Regardless of mine having been activated,
the injuries could have been avoided in this particular case, while the demining accident could
have ended up a demining accident. This accident would then be a lesson learned about how
much a visor can protect when a PMA-3 mine is activated.

RECOMMENDATIONS
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Based on what is stated above and in order to prevent further accidents from happening, the
Board of Inquiry issued the following recommendations:
The works in the teams should be stopped for 5 more days in order to stabilise the psychical
conditions of the personnel engaged on this task, all in order for them to re-gain their selfconfidence and reject the fear of a new accident. A one-day training is to be performed on the
procedures in the working lanes where there are rocks or other debris are scattered all over
the area. The need and the requirements for the BH Standard issued usage of the protective
equipment are to be analysed with the personnel.
The [Demining group] organisation with their Ops officer, group leader and the team leaders
is to analyse the sketch of the mined area provided in the Red Folder. All the knowledge
about existence of mines within the entire ring around the radar facility is to be input into the
sketch since this facility is of great importance. The knowledge gained so far is very clear,
proving that the area which is (according to the sketch) not mined, contains the layer of PMA3 mines, which is to connect existing PMA-1 mines on the South and PMA-2 mines drawn on
the N/W side. The first mines located within the first box as well as the mine activated with the
prodder clearly shows the irregular layer within the minefield. Since there is a great probability
of the density of mines in the areas, the usage of EDDs should be replaced with manual
methods.
[The Demining group] organisation is to reconsider the possibility for all the available areas to
be mechanically prepared, which would diminish the mine threat for deminers.
When using manual methods in areas with rock scattered over, rocks are to be gently
removed (taken up or pulled if bigger) to the safe areas, which would totally remove the mine
threat regarding the possibility of a mine left under a stone / rock scattered during bombing
over mined areas.
The organisation is to take disciplinary measures against the team leader of the S-1 team,
since he took no measures against the deminers who do not use their protective equipment.
In future, organisation will take disciplinary measures against such deminers even if it comes
up to getting fired and the breach of the contract.

ANNEXES: [Not made available.]
A
B
C
D
E
E
F
G

Initial report
Board of Inquiry
Written statements of personnel – witnesses
General survey reports
Site sketch and the sketch of the accident location
Photographs of the site and of the location of the accident
Documentation of the team leader from the site, along with MAC inspectors’ reports
Copy of the deminers’ insurance

Signed: all BOI members
Distribution: [Demining group], RS MAC

Victim Report
Victim number: 429

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available
(insured)

Time to hospital: 45 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag-jacket
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Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Face
severe Eye
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim
was not wearing his visor and his error was not corrected.
No one actually witnessed the deminer prodding carelessly, so it is possible that he was
excavating properly according to SOPs when the accident occurred. His injuries were limited
to his eye and face, and it is likely that he would have escaped any serious injury if he had
been wearing his visor.
The demining group in question had an impressive range of demining techniques to call on
and appear to have been working in the difficult area with responsiveness and ingenuity.
However, metal-detectors were only used on 20% of the ground which raises questions about
the suitability of the drills and the metal-detector in use by the group. It seems that the victim
was not using a metal-detector, and if he had done so the accident might have been avoided.
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